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CHURCH, STATE, AND CHARTER:  
CANADA’S HIDDEN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
 
Jeremy Patrick* 
 
“And everyone is grateful that politico-religious battles in Canada belong only to 
the past.” 
 
  —Franklin Walker (1955)1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Canada doesn’t have an establishment clause; that is what we are told, time 
and time again, in books,2 law review articles,3 and occasionally even lower 
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 1. FRANKLIN A. WALKER, CATHOLIC EDUCATION & POLITICS IN UPPER CANADA: A STUDY OF 
THE DOCUMENTATION RELATIVE TO THE ORIGIN OF CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN THE 
ONTARIO SCHOOL SYSTEM 317 (1955). 
 2. See Pauline Côté, Public Management of Religious Diversity in Canada: Development of 
Technocratic Pluralism, in REGULATING RELIGION: CASE STUDIES FROM AROUND THE GLOBE 422 
(James T. Richardson, ed., 2004) (“clause 2a of the Charter contains no explicit parallel to the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”); Elizabeth J. Shilton, 
Religion and Public Education in Canada After the Charter, in RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE, THE 
STATE, AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE 217 (John 
McLaren & Harold Coward, eds., 1999) (describing Canada as “without an establishment clause”); 
Thomas L. Pangle, The Accommodation of Religion: A Tocquevillian Perspective, in THE 
CANADIAN AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 5 (Marian C. McKenna, 
ed., 1993) (stating that Canada is “lacking of course an ‘establishment clause’”); Irwin Cotler, 
Freedom of Assembly, Association, Conscience and Religion, in CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS 
AND FREEDOMS: COMMENTARY 201 (Walter S. Tarnopolsky & Gerald A. Beaudoin, eds., 1982) 
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court judgements.4  Hogg’s well-known treatise informs us that “[t]he 
establishment clause, which was intended to prohibit the establishment of an 
official church or religion in the United States, has no counterpart in s. 2(a) [of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms].”5  Similarly, another popular 
treatise on Canadian constitutional law tells us that “[u]nlike the language of the 
First Amendment to the American constitution, which guarantees the free 
exercise of religion and prohibits the establishment of religion, section 2(a) of 
the Charter does not prohibit government support for religion nor does it require 
state neutrality with respect to religion.”6 
 
(“How does the protection of freedom of religion dovetail with the absence of any guarantee 
against the establishment of religion[?]”). 
 3. See Grant Huscroft, Canadian and New Zealand Perspectives on the Separation of Church 
and State, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 507, 509 (2003) (“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . . . 
does not specifically require a separation of church and state”); Richard Moon, Liberty, Neutrality, 
and Inclusion: Religious Freedom Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 41 
BRANDEIS L.J. 563, 563 (2003) (“The Charter, however, does not include any obvious equivalent 
to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Bill of Rights.”); 
Shannon I. Smithey, Religious Freedom and Equality Concerns Under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,  34:1 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 85, 90 (2001) (“Unlike the the [sic] United States 
Bill of Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains no explicit limit on 
government support for religion.”); Iain T. Benson, Notes Towards a (Re)Definition of the 
“Secular,” 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 519, ¶ 44 (2000) (“[T]here is nothing in the [Charter] that 
precludes government encouragement of religion.  There is no non-establishment clause.”); Paul 
Horwitz, The Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and 
Beyond,  54 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 15 n.62 (1996) (stating that American Establishment 
Clause “lacks a direct parallel in the Charter”); Richard S. Kay, The Canadian Constitution and 
the Dangers of Establishment, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 361, 361 (1992) (“Translated to the 
terminology of the United States Constitution, Canada has a free exercise clause but no 
establishment clause.”); Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in 
Canada: The Impact of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1191, 1222 (1984) (“section 2(a) of the Charter, dealing with religious freedom, omits a non-
establishment component.”); Patrick Macklem, Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada, 
42 U. TORONTO. FAC. L. REV. 50, 74 (1984) (“there is no express separation of church and state 
provision in the Charter.”); Paul Bender, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
United States Bill of Rights: A Comparison, 28 MCGILL L.J. 811, 820 (1983) (“the Charter 
contains no prohibition, as does the U.S. First Amendment, upon governmental ‘establishment’ of 
religion.”). 
 4. See Rosenberg v. Outremont (City), [2001] R.J.Q. 1556, ¶ 28 (“Canada does not have a 
provision in its Constitution that is identical to [the establishment clause].”); Grant v. Canada 
(AG), [1995] F.C. 158, ¶ 10 (T.D.) (“it is obvious that the Canadian Constitution does not contain 
an explicit textual requirement that there be separation of church and state as exists in the anti-
establishment clause of the Constitution of the United States.”); Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of 
Education (Director), [1988] O.A.C 23, ¶ 50 (Ont. Ct. App.) (noting “the absence of an 
establishment clause in s. 2(a).”). 
 5. PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 39-2, at 979 (4th ed. 1997). 
 6. R.J. SHARPE, ET AL., THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 88 (2d ed. 2002). 
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Although it is certainly true that the Charter (Canada’s constitutional bill of 
rights) does not contain an explicit textual limitation on government 
establishments of religion, this prohibition is effectuated in other ways.  
Functionally, the Charter often mandates the separation of church and state in 
Canada.  This “hidden establishment clause” can be seen in court decisions 
invalidating prayer at city council meetings,7 religious education in public 
schools,8 and national Sunday closing legislation.9  Textually, state neutrality in 
religious matters can be guaranteed by a combination of the Charter’s equality 
guarantee in Section 1510 and the religious freedom guarantee in Section 2(a),11 
the latter of which is worded broadly enough to potentially include both a “free 
exercise” and an “anti-establishment” component.12  Relaxed  rules on standing 
and the provision for multiculturalism in Section 27 of the Charter provide 
additional support (functionally and textually, respectively) for the separationist 
position.13  Indeed, the rarely-quoted Supreme Court of Canada discussions of 
the interplay between secularism and religion in the Charter further undermine 
the conventional wisdom in this area.14 
The next section of this Article summarizes how American courts have 
interpreted their Constitution’s Establishment Clause and provides a brief 
historical overview of the relationship between church and state in Canada.  
Section III compares the actual results of similar anti-establishment cases in the 
United States and Canada.  It concludes, functionally, that there is little 
difference between them.  Section IV examines the way the Supreme Court of 
Canada and other courts have articulated the textual guarantee of religious 
freedom under the Charter, while Section V suggests that the Charter’s 
preamble and constitutional protection for denominational schooling do not 
undermine the general requirement that church and state remain separate. 
“A good bit of the history of the West is a story of the ongoing struggle 
over what we now routinely call church and state, and their respective 
 
 7. See Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), [1999] O.A.C 139. 
 8. See Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Ontario (Minister of Education), [1990] O.R.2d 341 
(Ont. Ct. App.). 
 9. See R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
 10. Section 15(1) of the Charter provides that “Every individual . . . has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination . . . based on . . . religion . . . .”  
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B of the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, § 15(1). 
 11. The Charter states that “[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of 
conscience and religion . . . .”  Id. at 2(a). 
 12. See infra Section IV. 
 13. See infra notes 122, 126 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Section IV. 
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purviews.”15  This history continues in Canada, with the Charter speeding up the 
gradual separation of the two in a process that began even before Confederation.  
If, as Chief Justice McLachlin asserts, “the Charter has ushered in a new era of 
protection for religious conscience in Canada,”16 it appears that substantial credit 
should be given to the separationist spirit of the document. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. The American Establishment Clause 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution begins: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof. . . .”17  The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this language as 
creating two distinct guarantees of religious freedom, labelling the first part the 
Establishment Clause and the second, the Free Exercise Clause.18  Although a 
clear distinction is not always possible, the Free Exercise Clause usually applies 
to government burdens on a plaintiff’s religious belief or practice, while the 
Establishment Clause applies when a government practice benefits one or more 
religious groups.19  An important distinction between the two is that coercion is 
an essential element only in a Free Exercise Clause claim—legislation may be 
struck down under the Establishment Clause even if it does not directly burden 
anyone’s religious beliefs.20 
 
 15. Jean Bethke Elshtain, A Response to Chief Justice McLachlin, in RECOGNIZING RELIGION IN 
A SECULAR SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN PLURALISM, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC POLICY 36-37 (Douglas Farrow, 
ed., 2004). 
 16. Beverly McLachlin, Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective, in 
Farrow, supra note 15, at 13.  See also David H. Moore, Comment, Religious Freedom and 
Doctrines of Reluctance in Post-Charter Canada, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1087, 1139 (1996) (“The 
Charter thus appears to have worked a significant change in the direction of Canada’s religious 
freedom jurisprudence.”). 
 17. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
 18. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) (“The Free Exercise Clause embraces 
a freedom of conscience and worship . . . but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on 
forms of state intervention in religious affairs . . . .”).  Terminology in this area can be confusing, 
as the Establishment Clause is, of course, a prohibition on the establishment of religion and thus 
embodies anti-establishment values in a larger political or philosophical sense.  The use of 
“Establishment Clause” is almost universal, but occasionally one will see a reference to the “anti-
establishment clause” of the First Amendment.  Both refer to the same thing. 
 19. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 13-14 (1995). 
 20. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“The Establishment Clause, unlike the 
Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and 
is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate 
directly to coerce non[-]observing individuals or not.”). 
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In a broad sense, judicial interpretation of each clause has revolved around 
the concept of neutrality.21  In the Free Exercise Clause context, legislation that 
burdens religion may be declared unconstitutional only if it is not “generally 
applicable [and] religion-neutral . . . .”22  Under the Establishment Clause, 
legislation must not discriminate between religions, endorse religion, or advance 
religion over non-religion.23  Neutrality, like other broad concepts (such as 
“equality” or “liberty”), is widely accepted as a legitimate goal in principle but 
has proven far more contentious in practice.24  This has created a large measure 
of doctrinal incoherence in the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause; many cases are determined by 5-4 shifting majorities or by plurality 
opinions.25  Perhaps some of the difficulty comes from the fact that the Court 
examines a wide variety of practices under the Clause.  One commentator has 
noted: “The potential forms of establishment may vary.  There can be formal, de 
jure establishments or informal, de facto establishments.  These establishments 
 
 21. See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original 
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future 75 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (2000) (“[F]ormal 
neutrality has become the dominant theme under both the Free Exercise and the Establishment 
Clauses.”); see also David C. Williams et al., Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. 
REV. 769, 889 (1991) (“Preservation of government neutrality toward, and avoidance of official 
discrimination between, religions is one recurring concern in religion clause cases.”). 
 22. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (A statute that is not religion-
neutral and generally applicable can still be upheld if the government can demonstrate a 
compelling interest.  Prior to this case, American interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause was 
more akin to the Canadian approach: all substantial burdens on religion had to be justified by a 
compelling interest.); see generally Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). . 
 23. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793 (2000); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971) (Additionally, legislation must have a predominantly secular purpose and not create an 
excessive entanglement with religion.). 
 24. See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality 
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 994 (1990) (“We can agree on the principle of 
neutrality without having agreed on anything at all.  From benevolent neutrality to separate but 
equal, people with a vast range of views on church and state have all claimed to be neutral.”) 
(footnote omitted); CHOPER, supra note 19, at 20 (“[T]he principle of neutrality may be formulated 
in a variety of ways, and the abstract notion of equality demands further content.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 25. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 155 (2d ed. 1994) (“Sometimes the justices make distinctions that would glaze the 
minds of medieval scholastics.”); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., The Robe and the Cloth: The Supreme 
Court and Religion in the United States, in CANADIAN AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
2, at 46 (“Professional commentators, in turn, criticize the incoherence and unpredictability of the 
[Court’s] decisions.  Everyone has a favorite list of anomalies.”). 
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may be symbolic or substantive in nature, and may render official a generic 
religion, a collection of faiths (or denominations), or just one faith.”26 
Examples of statutes or practices struck down under the Establishment 
Clause include government prayer at high school graduations,27 tax exemptions 
solely for religious publications,28 laws regulating the sale of kosher foods,29 and 
the erection of plaques featuring the Ten Commandments in school 
classrooms.30 
In highly controversial cases—such as those involving abortion or capital 
punishment—legal trends often follow political developments.  The same holds 
true for judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause: the Court is currently 
split largely on conservative/liberal lines, with the former more willing to allow 
government aid towards or involvement in religion.  At least for the time being, 
however, the separation of church and state (expressed through government 
neutrality towards religion and between denominations) is a guiding principle of 
religious freedom in the United States. 
 
B. Church & State Before the Charter 
“It is axiomatic that religion has played a major role in the history of the 
United States and Canada, both in the shaping of each nation and in the 
formation of its own particular national character.”31  Many of the original 
settlers in the American colonies fled Europe to escape the religious persecution 
caused by established religions in their countries of origin.32  Once settled in 
North America, however, the colonists often created religious establishments of 
their own.33  Likewise, although the first European settlements, in what today is 
 
 26. Rex Adhar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent With Religious Freedom? 49 MCGILL 
L.J. 635, 642 (2004) (footnote omitted).  See also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 869-70 (2000) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting difficulty in applying a single rule to very disparate phenomena). 
 27. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 28. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 29. E.g., Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 30. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 31. John S. Moir, Canadian Religious Historiography—An Overview, in CHRISTIANITY IN 
CANADA: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 136 (Paul Laverdure ed., 2002) (several of the essays in this book, 
all written by noted religious historian John Moir, are useful for gaining an understanding of the 
early relationship between church and state in Canada). 
 32. See Howard, supra note 25, at 26 (“The clauses were written against a backdrop of 
centuries of religious warfare, persecution, and intolerance abroad, not to mention their offshots in 
the colonies.”). 
 33. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427 (1962) (“[W]hen some of the very groups which had 
most strenuously opposed the established Church of England found themselves sufficiently in 
control of colonial governments in this country . . . they passed laws making their own religion the 
official religion . . . .”); see also Cornelia H. Dayton, Excommunicating the Governor’s Wife: 
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Canada, had different origins, they, too, quickly came under the sway of a 
government closely linked with a single church. 
As early as 1627, Protestantism was outlawed in Canadian territory 
controlled by France and, by extension, the Catholic Church.34  For several 
decades thereafter, the Catholic Church in New France acted as an arm of the 
State.35  After the English conquest in 1760, Great Britain allowed limited 
religious freedom for Catholics while instructing governors to “hold the 
[Catholic] church on a tight leash, to restrict its freedom as much as possible, 
and to do everything they could to promote the interests of the Protestant 
religion.”36  Between 1750 and 1802, Protestantism became the official religion 
in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, and it was a favoured religion in 
Newfoundland and Upper Canada (Ontario).37  Historian Robert Choquette 
summarized early church/state relations in Canada: 
 
If Canada did not end up with the Church of England as a full-
blown state religion, it was not for lack of trying by the 
government of Great Britain in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century.  The policy of establishment ran aground on the shoals 
of political, ethnic, social, economic, and religious diversity.38 
 
Favoritism for the Church of England included special privileges in 
political appointments, the selection of military and legislative chaplains, and 
 
Religious Dissent in the Puritan Colonies Before the Era of Consciousness, in RELIGIOUS 
CONSCIENCE, THE STATE, AND THE LAW: HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND CONTEMPORARY 
SIGNIFICANCE, supra note 2, at 29. 
 34. See ROBERT CHOQUETTE, CANADA’S RELIGIONS: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 133 
(2004). 
 35. See CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADA 1627-1867: BASIC DOCUMENTS 21-22 (John S. Moir 
ed., 1967); D.A. SCHMEISER, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CANADA 60 (1964) (“In the early days of Canada, 
when it was still part of the French Empire and known as the Colony of New France, the Roman 
Catholic Church was the established church.  Secularism was absent, and the clergy were active in 
the daily affairs of the colonists.”); see also Denise J. Doyle, Religious Freedom in Canada, 26 J. 
CHURCH & STATE 413, 414 (1984). 
 36. CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 145.  See also John S. Moir, The Search for a Christian 
Canada, in CHRISTIANITY IN CANADA, supra note 31, at 13 (“In 1774, on the eve of that 
[American] Revolution, the Quebec Act gave the Catholic church in Quebec legal recognition 
along with Anglicanism, the religion of the monarch and supposedly of his subjects.  The Act’s 
purpose was to keep Quebec British by keeping it French and Roman Catholic . . . .”  In other 
words, a limited alliance with the still-dominant Catholic Church in Quebec was seen as necessary 
to forestall the spread of the revolution occurring in the American colonies.). 
 37. See CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 162-63. 
 38. Id. at 165.  See also Cotler, supra note 2, at 186 (“the Church of England was, if not the 
established church, at least for a while the privileged church in Upper Canada from 1791 until the 
Freedom of Worship Act of 1851 . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
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marriage laws.39  However, two particular kinds of establishments caused 
enormous controversy during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
The first was known as the Clergy Reserves.  In the Constitutional Act of 
1791, one-seventh of all public land in Upper and Lower Canada was allotted to 
support Protestant clergy.40  Income from this land, comprising almost two and 
one-half million acres, was channelled solely to the Church of England.41  Not 
surprising, this provoked intense jealously among other religious denominations, 
and such controversy was viewed as a contributing cause to the failed rebellion 
of 1837.42  To placate some of the denominations, the Reserves were partially 
opened to other denominations in 1840.43  Still, the mere existence of the 
Reserves led to a “bitter and noisy”44 dispute, which was seen as especially 
problematic to voluntarists (denominations opposed to government support of 
religion) who were “eager to abolish, not share, an establishment which [to 
them] was unbiblical, political, and injurious to other denominations.”45  After 
several more years of controversy, the Reserves were finally abolished in 1854.46 
A second, similar outcry rose up over the related issue of rectory 
endowments.  In 1836, the government erected forty-four rectories for the 
Church of England and endowed them with land from the Clergy Reserves.47  
 
 39. See Moir, supra note 36, at 15. 
 40. See generally E.R. STIMSON, HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN 
CANADA 27, 28, 32 (2d. ed. 1887) (This unscholarly and somewhat amusing book is focussed 
entirely on the Clergy Reserves.  In consecutive sentences, the Reserves are described as a “bone 
of contention” and an “apple of discord.”).  See also CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADA 1627-1867, 
supra note 35, at 159-266; CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 220-22; Doyle, supra note 35, at 416-17. 
 41. See Moir, supra note 36, at 14. 
 42. Id. at 16. 
 43. See Daly v. Ontario, [1999] 44 O.R.3d 349, ¶ 18 (Ont. Ct. App.); John S. Moir, Loyalism 
and the Canadian Churches, in CHRISTIANITY IN CANADA, supra note 31, at 79; accord Doyle, 
supra note 35, at 416 (“The Act did not state clearly that only the Anglicans could benefit from the 
clergy reserves.  The reserves were for a ‘Protestant clergy.’  The interpretation of this clause . . . 
caused bitter disputes for over fifty years.”) 
 44. Moir, supra note 36, at 17. 
 45. Id. at 15.  See also Doyle, supra note 35, at 416-17 (“While the Church of England wanted 
to have an unequivocal statement of its position as the state Church, there were others who 
believed that church and state should not be closely linked and that churches should be supported 
by the voluntary contributions of their membership.”). 
 46. See CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADA 1627-1867, supra note 35, at 243-45 (reprinting statute 
of abolition). 
 47. See STIMSON, supra note 40, at 142-43. According to Stimson, “In 1836 the people of 
Canada were startled, and great indignation was manifested, by the discovery that . . . Governor 
Colborne . . . had created forty-four rectories of the Church of England. . . . This act of the 
Governor in Council was generally regarded as a breach of public faith, an unwarranted exercise of 
power, and a daring violation of the rights of the people . . . .”  Id. at 142.  See also Moir, supra 
note 35, at 196-211. 
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“The voluntarist reaction to this development was immediate and loud—the 
rectories were illegal and provocative.”48  Legislation allowing for the 
endowment of rectories was repealed in 1851.49 
The Clergy Reserves Act of 1854 not only abolished the Reserves, it 
proclaimed an intention to “remove all semblance of connexion between Church 
and State . . . .”50  Indeed, to both Choquette and noted religious historian John 
Moir, the abolishment of the Reserves was a major turning point.  Choquette 
calls it the “end of an era in the relations between the churches and state in 
Canada,”51 while Moir, probably overstating the case, called the Reserves “the 
last vestige of establishment,”52 and argued that, along with the secularization of 
King’s College, the 1854 Act “created practical separation of church and state in 
Canada . . . .”53  The result was that by the time of Confederation in 1867, a state 
of “legally disestablished religiosity”54 prevailed in Canada.  To Moir, this 
meant that “Canadians in fact assume the presence of an unwritten separation of 
church and state, without denying an essential connection between religious 
 
 48. Moir, supra note 36, at 16. 
 49. See Doyle, supra note 35, at 417-18.  This repealing statute contained an important 
provision which remains in effect in Ontario and Quebec: 
 
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without 
discrimination or preference, provided the same be not made an excuse for acts 
of licentiousness, or a justification of practices inconsistent with the peace and 
safety of the Province, is by the constitution and laws of this Province assured 
to all Her Majesty’s subjects within the same. 
 
Religious Freedom Act, R.S.O., ch. R 22 (199) (emphasis added).  See also Freedom of Worship 
Act, R.S.Q., ch. L-2. 
 50. Moir, supra note 36, at 17. 
 51. CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 223. 
 52. Moir, The Canadianization of the Protestant Churches, in CHRISTIANITY IN CANADA, supra 
note 31, at 46. 
 53. Moir, supra note 43, at 80.  Most Canadian colleges and universities apparently became 
secular much later than King’s College.  See, e.g., CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 298 (“It was only 
during the last third of the twentieth century that the confessional ties of most of Canada’s colleges 
and universities were severed.”). 
 54. CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 35, at xiii; see also id. at xix (“In both the Maritime 
colonies and in the Province of Canada practical disestablishment, meaning in truth the abolition of 
a few Anglican privileges, was complete by 1867.”); Doyle, supra note 35, at 419 (“Confederation 
marked the end of the struggle for the recognition of religious equality.  The people of Canada had 
rejected the supremacy of any state church.”); Peter Beyer, Modern Forms of the Religious Life: 
Denomination, Church, and Invisible Religion in Canada, the United States, and Europe, in 
RETHINKING CHURCH, STATE, AND MODERNITY: CANADA BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA 189, 
207 (David Lyon & Marguerite Van Die eds., 2000) (noting “the rough simultaneity of 
Confederation and disestablishment”). 
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principles and national life or the right of the churches to speak out on matters of 
public importance.”55 
With the exception of denominational schools and the reference to “God” in 
the Charter’s preamble,56 what signs of establishment remain?  There are still 
some remnants of an earlier age, but they appear to be of the relatively minor, 
non-coercive type of symbolism that is referred to as “ceremonial deisms”57 in 
the United States.  For example, the Canadian national anthem makes reference 
to a deity,58 the House of Commons opens with an avowedly non-
denominational prayer,59 and the Queen, as formal head of state, is required by 
English law to practice Protestantism.60  Otherwise, one is hard pressed to think 
of any legislation or practices in Canada that would constitute a clear violation of 
the American Constitution’s Establishment Clause as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court.  Indeed, over forty years ago, Schmeiser’s Civil Liberties 
in Canada discussed “how completely the idea of establishment has been 
rejected.  All religions are equal before the law, and no special legal advantages 
or privileges are gained through membership in any denomination.”61 
 
 55. CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 35, at xiii.  Practically speaking, it might be fair to say that 
disestablishment in Quebec was adopted as a governing principle only during the 1960s “Quiet 
Revolution.”  See, e.g., David Seljak, Resisting the “No Man’s Land” of Private Religion: The 
Catholic Church and Public Politics in Quebec, in RETHINKING CHURCH, supra note 54, at 132 
(noting that before the Quiet Revolution, “The [Catholic] Church controlled virtually all education, 
health care, and social services for French Quebeckers, who formed the majority of the 
population.”).  See also Gregory Baum, Catholicism and Secularization in Quebec, in RETHINKING 
CHURCH, supra note 54, at 149-65; Peter Beyer, Roman Catholicism in Contemporary Quebec: 
The Ghosts of Religion Past?, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION: A CANADIAN FOCUS 133-55 
(1993). 
 56. See discussion infra Part V. 
 57. This is not to imply that ceremonial deisms are not problematic in their own right, but for 
the most part they have not been found unconstitutional in the United States.  An example in the 
American context is the phrase “In God We Trust” on currency.  See, e.g., Jeremy Patrick, 
Ceremonial Deisms 62:1 Humanist 42 (2002); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality 
of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1996).  An example in the Canadian context 
might be the recent controversy over whether the Governor-General should have a “Christmas 
Tree” or a “Holiday Tree.”  See  Editorial, Barking Up the Wrong Tree, OTTAWA CITIZEN, 
November 29, 2005, at D4. 
 58. See Douglas Farrow, Of Secularity and Civil Religion, in RECOGNIZING RELIGION, supra 
note 15, at 161. 
 59. See Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), [1999] O.R.3d 301 (Ont. Ct. App.). 
 60. See Kay, supra note 3, at 361; see also O’Donohue v. Canada, 2003 C.R.R.2d 1. 
 61. SCHMEISER, supra note 35, at 55.  Schmeiser’s 1964 book noted, however, that “[e]ven 
today in Canada separation of Church and State is not a meaningful term.  Problems which arise 
are usually settled by notions of fairness or justice, rather than by mechanical references to a 
separation formula.”  Id. at 56. 
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Indeed, given the political climate in the United States, Canada today may 
have an even greater de facto separation of church and state in areas other than 
denominational schooling.  “God is seldom mentioned in Parliament or the 
press,”62 “officials assiduously try to separate religion from politics,”63 and “[i]t 
is commonplace for scholars and judges to regard Canada . . . as secular . . . .”64  
The causes of this trend might be traced, at least in part, to the increase in non-
Christian religions in Canada65 and the rise of “religious nones,” persons who 
claim no affiliation with an organized religion.66  Choquette sums it up nicely: 
 
Although English Protestant and French Catholic Canada 
secularized at different times and in different ways, the end 
result is almost identical, that is to say a contemporary Canada 
whose institutions, symbols, leaders, and discourse make little 
reference to God or the supernatural.  Some would argue that 
even the consciences and value systems of Canadians are largely 
secularized.67 
 
The following sections examine the extent to which the Charter has 
increased this secularization. 
 
 62. David Lyon, Introduction, in RETHINKING CHURCH, supra note 54, at 10. 
 63. Ron Csillag, Mixing God and Politics, TORONTO STAR, June 5, 2004 at M6.  The views of 
the four major candidates for Prime Minister in the 2006 Federal election are reproduced in “Faith 
and Politics.”  Faith and Politics, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 21, 2006, at M6. 
 64. John Von Heyking, The Harmonization of Heaven and Earth?: Religion, Politics, and Law 
in Canada, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 663, 667 (2000). 
 65. See RETHINKING CHURCH, supra note 54, at 4 (“in contemporary Canada the Christian 
monopoly on religious identity no longer obtains.  There always were pockets of difference, but 
today many faith traditions are found in Canada.”); Zylberberg v. Sudbury (Bd. of Educ.), [1988] 
O.R.2d 641 (Ont. Ct. App.) (“Since World War II, Ontario has changed from a population 
composed almost entirely of Christians to an ethnically diverse, multireligious and multicultural 
society.”)  For example, in 1951, 96% of Canadians were either Catholic or Protestant; in 1999 
only 71% still claimed affiliation with one of these two groups.  See STATISTICS CANADA, 
CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS PROFILE SERIES, RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN CANADA 3 (2001). 
 66. See generally Merlin Brinkerhoff & Marlene Mackie, Nonbelief in Canada: Characteristics 
and Origins of Religious Nones, in SOCIOLOGY OF RELGION: A CANADIAN FOCUS, supra note 55, at 
109, 110-13 (describing rise in religious nones from 4.4% in 1971 to between 10.2 and 12.1% in 
1990); Statistics Canada reported that 16% of Canadians reported having no religious affiliation, 
compared to 7% in 1981.  STATISTICS CANADA, supra note 65, at 3. 
 67. CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 354-55; Although not strictly relevant to the separation of 
church and state, other useful sources for information on religious freedom in Canada before the 
Charter include THOMAS R. BERGER, FRAGILE FREEDOMS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSENT IN 
CANADA 163-89 (1981) ; David M. Brown, Freedom From or Freedom For?: Religion as a Case 
Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights, 33 U. BRIT COLUM. L. REV. 551, 552-60 (2000); 
see also Doyle, supra note 35. 
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III. THE HIDDEN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
 
The theory that the Charter contains a “hidden” establishment clause arises 
from a comparison of U.S. Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Canada 
holdings in similar cases involving the separation of church and state.  
Fundamentally, the analysis is a functional68 one of the type promulgated by the 
legal realist69 school of thought: rhetoric and constitutional text aside, what will 
the courts actually do when faced with similar issues?  Frederic Schauer sums up 
the view as one where: 
 
[F]ormal texts explain only a small part of differences among 
legal outcomes, and thus differences in textual style are likely 
less important in generating divergent outcomes than are 
differences in background and political culture, judicial 
acculturation, and the moral dispositions and policy preferences 
of individual judges.  Conversely, similarities in political culture, 
judicial acculturation, and judicial policy preference would be 
expected to produce substantial similarities in outcome even in 
the face of substantial differences in the formal law.70 
 
The argument in this section is that, whether due to similarities in political 
culture, judicial preferences, or increasing secularism, Canada and the United 
States respond to church-state issues in similar manners.71  The American Bill of 
 
 68. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999) (“Functionalism claims that particular constitutional provisions create 
arrangements that serve particular functions in a system of governance.  Comparative 
constitutional study can help identify those functions and show how different constitutional 
provisions serve the same function in different constitutional systems.”) (footnote omitted). 
 69. See id. at 1232 n.30 (linking functionalism and legal realism).  See also id. at 1235 
(“[F]unctional inquiries are inherently empirical.  They prompt the courts to make some 
assessment of the way institutions work in the real world—how will courts work when given 
information of a certain sort . . . .”). 
 70. Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295, 1296 (1997). 
 71. On freedom of religion broadly, this point is made by Shilton, supra note 2, at 217 (“Our 
courts have been hesitant to date to justify distinctions between Canadian and American 
jurisprudential outcomes in religion cases by resort to semantic differences between constitutional 
guarantees . . . .”); accord Horwitz, supra note 3, at 15-16 (“[D]espite our differences, Canadian 
and American courts have often achieved similar results in freedom of religion cases . . . .”).  Of 
course, exercises of this sort must be done carefully, as noted by Kay, supra note 3, at 370 
(“[E]very exercise of comparison must be undertaken with a careful attention to the differences in 
context that are inevitably present.”). 
 2006]     CHURCH, STATE, AND CHARTER 37 
Rights was an important influence on the wording of the Charter,72 and 
American court decisions continue to have an important impact on Canadian 
decisions.73  The hidden establishment clause argument does not suggest that 
either Canada or the United States have necessarily achieved a “rational” or 
“complete” separation of church and state, but only that they resolve such issues 
in a similar way.  As with all good theories, this one is empirically falsifiable: 
have there been any occasions where the Supreme Court of Canada declined to 
separate church and state but, faced with a similar issue, the United States 
Supreme Court has?  Except for constitutionally-guaranteed denominational 
schools, it would seem that Canadian jurisprudence closely tracks that of the 
United States on traditional separation of church and state issues, regardless of 
any textual differences between the American Constitution and the Charter. 
 
A. Sunday Closing Laws 
Any discussion of religious freedom in Canada inevitably involves the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s 1985 decision in R. v. Big M Drug Mart,74 a case 
involving the constitutionality of the Federal Lord’s Day Act.  The Act, with 
limited exceptions, forbade the sale of goods or merchandise on Sundays.75  
After a corporation was criminally charged for illegally selling goods under the 
Act, the Court was given its first opportunity to apply the religious freedom 
guarantee of section 2(a) of the Charter.  The Court interpreted section 2(a) as 
meaning that legislation with either a religious purpose or a coercive religious 
effect would violate the religious freedom guarantee.76  Because the Act’s 
 
 72. See William R. McKercher, The United States Bill of Rights: Implications for Canada, in 
THE U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 7, 19 (William 
R. McKercher ed., 1993. 
 73. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Religion, 
Expression, and Association in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 20 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT. L. 577, 618 (1988) (“The Supreme Court of Canada has specifically recognized the 
relevance of the American constitutional experience in interpretation of the Charter.”); see also 
Horwitz, supra note 3, at 15 (“American jurisprudence is unquestionably useful, both for an 
understanding of the role of religion in a liberal democracy and for a specific analysis of the 
content of s. 2(a) . . . .”). 
 74. [1985] S.C.R. 295.  See, e.g., Benjamin Berger, The Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, 
Secularism, and the Liberal State, 17 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 39, 57 (calling Big M “a foundational 
opinion on the meaning of religious freedom”); see also Heyking, supra note 64, at 667 (calling 
Big M “the fundamental religious freedom case in Canada”); see also Janet Epp Buckingham, 
Caesar and God: Limits to Religious Freedom in Canada and South Africa 15 S.C.L.R. (2d) 461 
(2001) (referring to the “seminal” Big M case).  See generally Mike Brundett, Demythologizing 
Sunday Shopping: Sunday Retail Restrictions and the Charter, 50 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 1 (1992).  
Because Big M and some of the other cases in this section have been discussed ad nauseum in the 
legal literature, only brief summaries have been provided here. 
 75. The R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.R. 295, ¶¶ 5-8. 
 76. See id. ¶¶ 78-84. 
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“religious purpose, in compelling sabbatical observance, has been long-
established and consistently maintained by the courts of this country[,]”77 the 
Court easily found that the Act violated section 2(a) and struck it down 
accordingly.  Applying the purpose rule one year later, however, the Court found 
that an Ontario Sunday closing law had a legitimate secular purpose in creating a 
common rest day for workers, and upheld its constitutionality.78 
The Court’s ruling that a religious purpose could invalidate legislation is 
important because, strictly speaking, it is irrelevant to the question of whether an 
individual’s religious freedom has been burdened by the law.  In other words, it 
closely tracks the American rule under the Establishment Clause where 
legislation can also be struck down for having a primarily religious purpose.79  
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada’s rulings in regard to Sunday closing laws 
were substantially similar to rulings on the issue made by the United States 
Supreme Court almost twenty-five years earlier.  In McGowan v. Maryland,80 
the United States Supreme Court upheld a state’s Sunday closing law on the 
ground that it had a legitimate secular purpose, but the Court was careful to point 
 
 77. Id. ¶¶ 78, 164; see Berger, supra note 74, at 54 (“The Supreme Court of Canada considered 
the purpose and nature of the legislation, and, while recognizing that there are both secular and 
religious aspects to the law, decided that from both a historical and theological perspective, there 
was sufficient Christian content to characterize this law as having a religious purpose.”). 
 78. See R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.  See also Moore, supra note 
16, at 1115 (“The critical difference producing the opposing outcomes in Big M and Edwards 
appears to be that Ontario’s Retail Business Act boasted an objective . . . that was arguably secular 
and that could justify the burdens it imposed on religious freedom, while the Lord’s Day Act could 
not elude its religious objective.”) (footnote omitted)).  The Court also found that any coercive 
effects of the legislation were justified under section 1 of the Charter.  See Edwards, 2 S.C.R. 713, 
¶¶ 118-121. 
 79. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU Kentucky, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005).  This fact was 
recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Big M itself.  See R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 
S.C.R. 295, ¶ 82 (“This approach to the relevance of purpose and effect is explicit in the American 
cases.”).  There appears to be ambiguity in the Canadian caselaw as to exactly what is meant by a 
religious purpose.  That is, are the statutes invalid for having religious purpose simpliciter or 
invalid only if their purpose is to actually coerce someone into participating in an unwanted 
religious practice?  Compare Islamic Sch. Fed’n v. Ottawa Bd. of Educ., [1997] 145 D.L.R.4th 
659, 662 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (asking simply whether the statute had a secular or a religious purpose) 
with Grant v. Canada, [1995] 1 F.C. 158, ¶ 80 (T.D.) (“[I]it is necessary to demonstrate that the 
religious purpose is such as to either constrain an individual’s chosen religious practice or 
expression or to compel or coerce participation in religious practices or observances which the 
individual would not freely choose.”).  The difference between the two interpretations is subtle but 
important, as it would presumably be far harder to show that a legislature actually intended to 
coerce non-believers than to show that a statute was passed to advance or endorse religion 
generally.  Under either interpretation, an interesting issue is the degree to which a statute’s 
purpose can or should be inferred from its text and effects. 
 80. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).  McGowan is the best known of the U.S. Sunday closing cases; 
several others are cited in Heyking, supra note 64, at 677 n.53. 
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out that Sunday closing laws in other jurisdictions could be struck down if they 
had a religious purpose.81  Distinct constitutional provisions aside, the rule in 
each country mandates that a Sunday closing law is constitutional only if the 
government can articulate a secular purpose for its existence. 
 
B. Religious Education in Public Schools 
Students who went to Ontario public schools in the late 1980s witnessed 
firsthand what one commentator has called “a major . . . shift in defining the 
meaning of freedom of religion”82 in Canada.  As a result of two landmark 
Ontario Court of Appeal decisions, “it is now relatively settled law that 
majoritarian religious indoctrination and coercive religious practices are 
impermissible within the public school system.”83  In the first case, the Court of 
Appeal struck down the practice of beginning each school day with the recitation 
of the Lord’s Prayer and Bible readings;84 in the second case, the teaching of 
Christianity and its tenets as a matter of religious obligation was found 
unconstitutional.85  Although for each practice the schools had a policy for 
excusing students who didn’t wish to participate, the Court found that religious 
exercises and confessional education in public schools are inherently coercive 
activities that violate section 2(a) of the Charter because they force students to 
make a religious declaration to be excused or suffer the judgment of their peers 
and teachers.86  According to a later court, the decisions “signify the end of an 
 
 81. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 453 (“We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a 
violation of the ‘Establishment’ Clause if it can be demonstrated that its purpose . . . is to use the 
State’s coercive power to aid religion.”). 
 82. Brown, supra note 67, at 584.  In Ontario, there are three general kinds of schools: public 
schools, Catholic (“separate” or “denominational”) schools, and private (“independent”) schools.  
Both public and Catholic schools receive government funding and oversight, and are considered 
state actors for the purposes of the Charter.  Id. at 596-97.  See, e.g., Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 
S.C.R. 609, ¶ 49 (discussing application of the Charter); CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 295 (noting 
that separate schools fall under jurisdiction of provincial ministries of education). 
 83. Shilton, supra note 2, at 213. 
 84. See Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education, [1988] 65 O.R.2d 641 (Ont. Ct. App.).  See 
also Manitoba Ass’n for Rights & Liberties v. Manitoba, [1992] 82 Man. R.2d 39 (Q.B.); Russow 
v. British Columbia, [1989] B.C.J. No. 611 (S.C.).  See generally Banafsheh Sokhansanj, Our 
Father Who Art in the Classroom: Exploring a Charter Challenge to Prayer in Public Schools, 56 
SASK. L.R. 47 (1992). 
 85. See CCLA v. Ontario (Minister of Education), [1990] 65 D.L.R.4th 1 (Ont. Ct. App.). 
 86. See Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education, [1988] 65 O.R.2d 641, ¶ 38 (Ont. Ct. App.) 
(“The peer pressure and the class-room norms to which children are acutely sensitive . . . are real 
and pervasive and operate to compel members of religious minorities to conform with majority 
religious practices.”); CCLA v. Ontario, [1990] 65 D.L.R.4th 1, ¶ 24 (Ont. Ct. App.) (“[T]eaching 
students Christian doctrine as if it were the exclusive means through which to develop moral 
thinking and behaviour amounts to religious coercion in the class-room.  It creates a direct burden 
on religious minorities and non-believers who do not adhere to majoritarian beliefs.”).  In addition 
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era of majoritarian Christian influence, and mark the beginning of . . . secularism 
in education, based on an awareness of a changing societal fabric and Charter 
protection for minority rights to freedom of religion.”87 
Over forty years ago, similar practices were struck down by the United 
States Supreme Court under the Establishment Clause.  In Engel v. Vitale,88 the 
Court struck down the practice of opening the school day with a short 
nondenominational prayer; a year later, in School District v. Schempp,89 the 
Court invalidated the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer and Bible verses.  Although 
the Court in Engel was careful to note that coercion was not a prerequisite of an 
Establishment Clause violation,90 it, like the Ontario Court of Appeal decades 
later, found that giving students the choice of observing majoritarian religious 
practices or excusing themselves constituted undue pressure.91  Once again, 
although there are differences in precise rationale used, practices struck down by 
using the Establishment Clause in the United States were invalidated in Canada 
through the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of religion. 
 
C. Prayer at Legislative Assemblies 
Shortly after the Charter first took effect in 1982, one commentator stated 
“[t]he absence of an establishment component in section 2(a) will also prevent 
constitutional challenge in Canada to practices such as the use of chaplains in 
legislative bodies . . . .”92  Fifteen years later, in Freitag v. Penetanguishene 
(Town),93 the Court found that a city council’s commencement of each  meeting 
with a recitation of the Lord’s Prayer violated the Charter’s guarantee of 
freedom of religion.  The case was brought by a resident of the city who often 
attended city council meetings and argued that he felt pressured to stand and say 
the prayer, even though he was never legally or physically coerced into doing 
so.
94
  The Court’s rationale is easy to follow: since Big M ruled that government 
practices may neither have the purpose nor effect of imposing religion on non-
 
to holding that the practices constituted a form of indirect coercion, equality arguments were 
discussed in each case.  However, the judgements are ambiguous as to whether non-sectarian 
practices would be more acceptable.  See Shilton, supra note 2, at 212. 
 87. Bal v. Att’y Gen. of Ont., 21 O.R.3d 681, 684 (Gen. Div.), aff’d, 34 O.R.3d 484 (Ont. Ct. 
App.). 
 88. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 89. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 90. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. 
 91. See id. at 431 (“When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed 
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to 
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”). 
 92. Sedler, supra note 3, at 1222 n.111. 
 93. [1999] 47 O.R.3d 301 (Ont. Ct. App.). 
 94. See id. ¶¶ 5, 26. 
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believers, the Court examined the purpose of starting every meeting with the 
Lord’s Prayer.  The Court found that the purpose was “to impose a specifically 
Christian moral tone on the deliberations of the Town Council” and therefore the 
plaintiff’s freedom of religion was violated.95  Building on the earlier education 
decisions, the Court also found the invocations  coercive, and stated that “[j]ust 
as children are entitled to attend public school and be free from coercion or 
pressure to conform to the religious practices of the majority, so everyone is 
entitled to attend public local council meetings and to enjoy the same 
freedom.”96 
Although not decided, the Court implied that a legitimate purpose in 
solemnizing the meeting could be constitutionally achieved through a non-
denominational prayer and a moment of silence, as is now the practice of the 
House of Commons.97  Five years later, this was exactly the ruling of the Ontario 
Superior Court when faced with a challenge to a city council’s use of a non-
denominational prayer that had been adopted after the Freitag decision.98  The 
result, that sectarian prayers are forbidden but “non-denominational” prayers are 
allowed, is unlikely to be satisfactory to either strict separationists or religious 
accommodationists, but is exactly the same rule applied in American 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
In the 1983 case Marsh v. Chambers,99 the U.S. Supreme Court deviated 
from its standard Establishment Clause test and found prayers or invocations by 
deliberative public bodies were constitutional when “there was no indication that 
the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or 
to disparage any other, faith or belief.”100  The rule that prayers by legislative 
bodies are constitutional if non-denominational but unconstitutional if sectarian 
is now well-settled and followed by lower courts.101 
 
 95. Id. ¶ 25. 
 96. Id. ¶ 34.  A similar challenge to the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer by the Ontario 
Legislative Assembly was rejected on jurisdictional grounds.  See Ontario (Speaker of the 
Legislative Assembly) v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2001] 54 O.R.3d 595 (Ont. Ct. 
App.).  See generally Michael D. Mysak, Houses of the Holy?  Reconciling Parliamentary 
Privilege and Freedom of Religion, 12 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 353 (2001).  
 97. See id. ¶ 52. 
 98. See Allen v. Renfrew (County), [2004] O.J. No. 1231 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).  Cf. R. v. Scott, 
[2004] C.M.A.J. No. 2, ¶ 5 (finding section 2(a) violated by requirement that soldiers take part in 
prayer and holding that “[t]he ‘non-denominational’ character of the prayer was wholly 
irrelevant . . . . A prayer is always and by definition religious.  That character does not change 
depending upon the organized religion with which it may or may not be associated.”). 
 99. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 100. Id. at 794-95. 
 101. Compare Simpson v. Chesterfield County, 404 F.3d 276, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding 
“non-sectarian invocation[s]”) with Wynne v. Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (striking 
down explicitly Christian invocations). 
 42 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. [Vol. 14:1 
 
D. Church Property Disputes 
The rule for over thirty years in the United States has been that when a 
religious organization splits apart or has other internal disputes over church 
property, courts are forbidden from inquiring into matters of doctrine or faith in 
resolving the issue.102  The reason, of course, is that “there is substantial danger 
that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or 
intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.”103  Since 
the advent of the Charter, indications are that Canadian courts are moving in a 
similar direction.  For example, Alvin Esau writes that: 
 
There is supposedly no Canadian theory of the separation of 
church and state standing in the way of judges attempting to 
muddle through religious documents and entertain the 
conflicting testimony of religious experts . . . . However, when 
we look at the performance of the Canadian courts . . . the gap 
between the American and the Canadian approach is not as wide 
as might be thought.104 
 
For example, in 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada noted, in a different 
factual context, that “[s]ecular judicial determinations of a theological or 
religious dispute, or of contentious matters of religious doctrine, unjustifiably 
entangle the court in the affairs of religion.”105  In practice, both American and 
Canadian courts appear to limit themselves to enforcing religion-neutral contract 
terms, often under the auspices of corporate or charitable-society legislation.106 
 
 102. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Dicoese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).  See generally 
Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998). 
 103. Serbian Eastern, 426 U.S. at 709.  See also Denise J. Doyle, Religious Freedom and 
Canadian Church Privileges, 26 J. CHURCH & ST. 293, 306 (1984) (“It would be counter-
productive for the separation of church and state if the civil courts entered into decision-making for 
churches or corrected decisions made in church disputes . . . .”). 
 104. Alvin J. Esau, The Judicial Resolution of Church Property Disputes: Canadian and 
American Models 40 ALTA. L.R. 767, 814 (2003). 
 105. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. 551, ¶ 50. 
 106. See id. ¶¶ 68-69; Doyle, supra note 103, at 307.  Although no cases have come to my 
attention, I suspect that the issue of tax exemptions for religious bodies would be upheld under the 
Charter as a non-discriminatory benefit provided to a wide variety of both religious and secular 
not-for-profit organizations.  See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 103, at 300 (“The churches and their 
agencies receive taxation exemptions as part of a larger category of registered charities.  
Registered charities are organizations, many having no religious affiliation, that do not work 
primarily for profit.”).  Tax exemptions for churches, as part of a larger scheme, have been found 
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Although Canada has reached similar results under section 2(a) of the 
Charter as the United States has under its Establishment Clause in the areas of 
Sunday closing laws, religious education in public schools, prayers at legislative 
bodies, resolution of church property disputes, and more,107 many issues have 
simply never arisen so far in Canadian courts.  For example, there appear to be 
no appellate opinions on religious monuments (such as the Ten Commandments) 
in public places or on government funding of specific religious groups.  
Although only time will tell how such issues will be resolved, broad statements 
made by judges and scholars about the meaning of section 2(a) suggest that 
government neutrality towards religion will remain the deciding factor.  These 
statements are discussed in the following section. 
 
IV. THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE 
 
If past conduct is a reliable guide to future actions, it appears that the 
United States and Canada will follow similar paths on most church-state 
questions.  However, do these results match the rhetoric?  Should the decisions 
of Canadian courts in this area be considered inconsistent with the way in which 
the Supreme Court of Canada and other commentators have articulated the 
principles underlying the Charter’s guarantee of religious freedom?  A review of 
caselaw and legal literature indicates that neutrality has been a guiding principle 
of section 2(a) since the beginning. 
Big M, the Sunday closing case, set the tone for the SCC’s views on how 
the separation of church and state is reflected in section 2(a).  In response to 
government claims that the Sunday closing laws had to be upheld because the 
 
constitutional under the American Establishment Clause.  See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 
696 (1970). 
107. A fifth similarity would merit greater attention, but the case never advanced beyond a 
Québec trial court.  In Rosenberg v. Outremont (City), [2001] Q.J. No. 2858 (Qc. Sup. Ct.), the 
constitutionality of eruvin on municipal property was upheld.  In the Court’s words, “an eruv is a 
notional concept by which an otherwise open area is closed by the attachment of barely visible 
wires or strings to freestanding structures.  The purpose of an eruv is to avoid the prohibition in 
Jewish Law of removing things from one domain to another on the Sabbath and on Holidays . . . .  
[W]ithout an eruv, an Orthodox Jew is effectively housebound on the Sabbath and religious 
holidays if he or she wishes to or is required to take anything out of the house and bring it on to 
other property.”  Id. ¶ 7.  Individual religious freedom (of non-Orthodox Jews) and state neutrality 
were raised by the municipality as grounds for refusing to allow eruvin to be attached to city 
property.  However, the Court found that the city could not prohibit the eruvin, in part because “the 
[city] is not being asked to expend public funds, to advance the precepts of Orthodox Judaism, or 
to associate itself or its citizens in any way with the erection of eruvin.”  This holding accords with 
the weight of American precedent decided under the Establishment Clause.  See Tenafly Eruv 
Ass’n v. Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002); ACLU-NJ v. Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293 (D. 
N.J. 1987); Smith v. Community Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), aff’d, 133 
A.D.2d 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
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Charter’s guarantee of religious freedom allegedly lacked an establishment 
clause, the Court stated that the American dichotomy between “free exercise” 
and “establishment” cases was not an appropriate or helpful one for the 
Charter.108  According to the Court: 
 
[T]he applicability of the Charter guarantee of freedom of 
conscience and religion does not depend on the presence or 
absence of an ‘anti-establishment principle’ in the Canadian 
Constitution . . . .  The acceptability of legislation or 
governmental action which could be characterized as state aid 
for religion or religious activities will have to be determined on a 
case by case basis.109 
 
The proposition that section 2(a) incorporates, to an unclear degree, both 
“free exercise” and “anti-establishment” values in a unitary guarantee of 
religious freedom can be supported by the language of the text itself: “Everyone 
has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and 
religion . . . .”110  In other words, the Charter is not restricted to protecting only 
the free exercise of religion, but “freedom of . . . religion” in a larger sense.  This 
is important because freedom of religion has long been perceived as including a 
prohibition on the government identifying itself closely with a single religion.111  
 
 108. See R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, ¶¶ 102-105 (“In my view this recourse to 
categories from the American jurisprudence is not particularly helpful in defining the meaning of 
freedom of conscience and religion under the Charter.”). 
 109. Id. at 341.  See also, Smithey, supra note 3, at 93 (“It is clear in Big M Drug Mart that, 
even though the text of the Charter does not explicitly limit government sponsorship of religion, 
the Canadian Supreme Court has fashioned an anti-establishment principle by requiring the 
government to avoid sectarian favouritism.”); Lorraine Weinrib, Do Justice to Us!  Jews and the 
Constitution of Canada, in NOT WRITTEN IN STONE: JEWS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CANADA 66 n.43 (Daniel J. Elzar, et al. eds., 2003) (“While the Charter’s 
protection of freedom of religion and conscience does not expressly countermand establishment of 
religion, non-establishment values are clearly engaged in the interpretation of this provision.”). 
 110. Charter, § 2(a).  See generally Lorraine E. Weinrib, Book Review, The Religion Clauses: 
Reading the Lesson, 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 507, 517 (1986) ( “[T]he free exercise and anti-
establishment values of the American Bill of Rights text enter the Charter as a unity within section 
2(a).  The bifurcation of these values . . . need not arise under the Charter.”); Sokhansanj, supra 
note 84, at n.24 (“Canada has neither an establishment nor a free exercise clause, but rather 
constitutional protection of freedom of religion which incorporates elements of both American 
provisions.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Adhar & Leigh, supra note 26, ¶ 38 (“The two limbs or clauses of the [First 
Amendment] suggest that religious freedom itself could be envisaged as comprising two elements: 
non-establishment and free exercise.  We agree with those who contend that the two clauses are 
not in opposition but are complementary, both tending toward the same end.”); McCreary, supra 
note 79, at 2746 (“The First Amendment expresses our Nation’s fundamental commitment to 
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Because the free exercise of religion cannot flourish in a nation with an 
established church, a prohibition on state support for religion is an important 
instrumental means of achieving religious freedom in the narrow sense.112 
Government neutrality in religious affairs is a recurring concern.  For 
example, three judges of the Supreme Court of Canada recently wrote that: 
 
[I]t is no longer the state’s place to give active support to any 
one particular religion . . . The state must respect a variety of 
faiths whose values are not always easily reconciled.  . . . As a 
general rule, the state refrains from acting in matters relating to 
religion.  It is limited to setting up a social and legal framework 
in which beliefs are respected and members of the various 
denominations are able to associate freely in order to exercise 
their freedom of worship . . . In this context, the principle of 
neutrality must be taken into account in assessing the duty of 
public entities, such as municipalities, to actively help religious 
groups.113 
 
Similarly, lower court judges have stated that “Canada is a secular state, 
with freedom of religion,”114 that “[t]o prefer one religion over another . . . 
contravenes the provisions of the Charter relating to freedom of conscience and 
religion,”115 that the Charter “would certainly prevent any instrument of the 
State from establishing an official religion or discriminating against a particular 
 
religious liberty by means of two provisions—one protecting the free exercise of religion, the other 
barring establishment of religion.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Macklem, supra note 3, at 74 (“[I]t is important to recognize that concomitant 
with the protection of a certain religion is the non-protection of another.  This selective protection 
by the state has the effect of limiting religious freedom in general.  On these grounds, a separation 
of church and state principle . . . can be read into section 2(a).”); Adhar & Leigh, supra note 26, ¶ 
41 (“[S]eparation is an important instrumentalist means toward the larger end of protecting 
religious freedom.”). 
 113. Congregation des temoins de Jehovah v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] S.C.C. 48, [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 45, ¶ 68 (LeBel, J., dissenting).  See also Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist., [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 710, ¶ 211 (per LeBel, J.) (“Freedom of religion is not diminished, but is safeguarded, by 
the state’s abstention from favouring or promoting any specific religious creed.”); Rodriguez v. 
British Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶ 59 (Lamer, C.J. dissenting) (“[T]he Charter has 
established the essentially secular nature of Canadian society and the central place of freedom of 
conscience in the operation or our institutions.”). 
 114. Reed v. Canada, [1989] 3 F.C. 259, ¶ 6 (T.D). 
 115. MARL v. Manitoba (Minister of Education), [1992] 94 D.L.R.4th 678, 686. 
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religion,”116 and that “[t]he separation of church and state is a fundamental 
principle of our Canadian democracy and our constitutional law.”117 
This general concern for state neutrality towards religion is reflected in the 
test the SCC applies when faced with a freedom of religion question.  As 
discussed in the last section, the first question asked under the test is whether the 
statute or activity has a religious or secular purpose.118  If it has a legitimate 
purpose, the next question is whether it is religiously coercive.119  For separation 
of church and state purposes, the key aspect of the coercion test is that the Court 
has articulated and applied it in an extraordinarily broad manner, reaching a wide 
variety of tangible and intangible government burdens on religious belief: 
 
[I]ndirect coercion by the state is comprehended within the evils 
from which s. 2(a) may afford protection. . . . . It matters not, I 
believe, whether a coercive burden is direct or indirect, 
intentional or unintentional, foreseeable or unforeseeable.  All 
coercive burdens on the exercise of religious beliefs are 
potentially within the ambit of s. 2(a).120 
 
A broad interpretation of “coercion,” such as the one applied to prevent 
religious exercises in schools or sectarian invocations at legislative assemblies, 
makes it far more likely that litigants will succeed in challenging government-
sponsored religious activities or rituals.  Legal scholar Richard Moon notes, for 
example, that “the Canadian courts have taken such a broad view of religious 
coercion that any form of state support for the practices or beliefs of a particular 
 
 116. Rosenberg v. Outremont (City), No. 500-05-060659-008, [2001] Q.J. 2858, ¶ 42 (Québec 
Sup. Ct.). 
 117. Hall v. Powers, [2002] O.R.3d 423, ¶ 31. 
 118. See supra § III.A. 
 119. See, e.g., Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), supra note 93, ¶ 17 (“The court [in Big M] set 
out the proper approach when considering whether legislation infringes a guaranteed Charter right: 
one must look first at the purpose of that legislation; if its purpose is constitutionally benign, one 
looks also to its effects.”).  See also Kay, supra note 3, at 363 (“The Court in Big M Drug Mart, 
Ltd. relied on an expansive definition of freedom of religion . . . .  The reasoning  was . . . [that] the 
state could take no action which had either the purpose or the effect of coercing or otherwise 
putting pressure on the religious choices of individuals”). 
 120. R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, ¶ 96 (per Dickson, C.J.).  See also 
Brown, supra note 67, ¶ 27 (“[Dickson’s] description of freedom as being the absence of coercion 
or constraint, direct or indirect, justifies a broad examination of the impact of any state action on 
the religious beliefs and practices of an individual.  Legislation relying on subtle pressure stands on 
no better constitutional footing than that which relies on direct proscription or compulsion”); 
Moon, supra note 3, at 565-66 (“[T]the Canadian courts have taken a broad view of ‘coercion.’  
The courts have held, in a range of cases, that state support for a particular religion, or for religion 
in general, amounts to religious compulsion or restriction . . . .”). 
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religion, or for religious over non-religious belief systems, might be viewed as 
coercive and therefore contrary to s. 2(a).”121  Similarly, Richard Kay suggests 
that “the Court has necessarily brought into question many state actions that, on 
their surface, make no restriction on behavior but merely aid or approve 
religion.”122 
How does this work in practice?  Examples from American jurisprudence 
are illustrative.  For example, in the well-known cases challenging the erection 
of Ten Commandments or other religious monuments on public property under 
the Establishment Clause, standing is obtained by showing that the plaintiff 
suffered an “injury in fact” by direct and unwelcome contact with the religious 
display.  This can include, but does not require, a finding that the plaintiff 
changed his regular route to avoid the allegedly unconstitutional monument.123  
Although relevant only to standing in the American cases, a plausible argument 
could be made that unwelcome contact or avoidance of a similar display 
constitutes “indirect coercion” under Canadian religious freedom jurisprudence.  
Similarly, if a Canadian government body were to give subsidies to a particular 
denomination but refrain from giving to others, this could be viewed as 
indirectly coercing or punishing the less-favoured denominations. 
This last example raises important equality concerns and could conceivably 
be brought under the equality guarantee of section 15.  However, many cases 
decided under the religious freedom guarantee of section 2(a) have included 
discussions of equality without being specifically grounded on the equal 
protection provision of the Charter.124  It appears reasonable to conclude that 
 
 121. Moon, supra note 3, at 563-64.  Moon goes on to argue convincingly that the Canadian 
caselaw represents a shift in the “wrong” that religious freedom protects against from “coercion” to 
“exclusion.”  See id. at 567-68. 
 122. Kay, supra note 3, at 364.  Adhar & Leigh, supra note 26, ¶ 76 (noting the difficulty in 
defining “coercion” once it moves into the realm of “subtle” or “indirect” pressure). 
 123. See Marc Rohr, Tilting at Crosses: Nontaxpayer Standing to Sue Under the Establishment 
Clause, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495, 510-19 (1995); see also June M. Ross, Standing in Charter 
Declaratory Actions, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151 (1995); see also GÉRALD-A. BEAUDOIN & ERROL 
MENDES, CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (4th ed. 2004). 
 124. See Zylberberg, supra note 86, ¶ 38; see also CCLA, supra note 86, ¶ 24.  Other examples 
include R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 337, where the Court spoke about the 
“sectarian Christian” nature of the Sunday closing laws and Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), 
[1999] 47 O.R.3d 301 (Ont. Ct. App.), where the Court of Appeal paid particular attention to the 
specifically Christian nature of the challenged practice.  See also Smithey, supra note 3, at 97 
(“equality concerns have been very important to judicial interpretation of the Charter’s religious 
freedom provisions . . . judges have often struck down government policy that favoured a 
particular religious viewpoint”); Hogg, supra note 5, at 52-50 to 52-51 (suggesting that the Sunday 
closing and school religious exercise cases could “easily be viewed as equality cases in which 
benefits are conferred on Christians that are denied to the adherents of other religions”); Macklem, 
supra note 3, at 74 (“It can be argued that protection of a certain religion constitutes state-
sanctioned discrimination insofar as it represents unequal treatment on religious grounds”). 
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section 2(a) includes an equality component, just as the American Establishment 
Clause includes a strict prohibition on preferring some religions over others.125  
The multiculturalism provision of the Charter lends some support to this 
interpretation.126 
By requiring that statutes and practices have neither a religiously coercive 
purpose nor effect, the Supreme Court of Canada has made neutrality the 
touchstone of its religious freedom jurisprudence, in both theory and application.  
This move towards secularism in government affairs is bemoaned by many,127 
but is now well-established both by law and social consensus.  The next section 
discusses the last major vestiges of an earlier time when government support for 
religion was seen as legitimate: denominational schooling and the Charter’s 
Preamble. 
 
V. COMPLICATIONS 
 
It would be disingenuous to claim that the existence of publicly-funded 
denominational schools for particular religions in Canada is a minor breach of 
the separation of church and state.  As one commentator notes, “[f]ar from 
building a wall between church and state, when it comes to separate schools the 
Canadian Constitution builds a wall around the Roman Catholic Church and its 
relationship with the . . . government.”128  Indeed, denominational schooling 
rights, though recently removed or weakened in Newfoundland and Quebec,129 
 
 125. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).  See generally Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Strict 
Scrutiny for Denominational Preferences: Larson in Retrospect, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 53 (2005). 
 126. Section 27 of the Charter requires that fundamental freedoms “be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”  See 
generally Joseph Eliot Magnet, Multiculturalism and Collective Rights, in Beaudoin & Mendes, 
supra note 123, at 1261-1316.  This provision, although never decisive, has been invoked by courts 
in support of religious freedom in cases that helped to disestablish majoritarian religions.  See, e.g., 
R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 337-338; Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), 47 
O.R.3d 301, ¶ 46. 
 127. See, e.g., Heyking, supra note 64; see also Benson, supra note 3; see also Brown, supra 
note 67. 
 128. Huscroft, supra note 3, at 509.  Background on the denominational schooling issue can be 
found in John S. Moir, The Origin of the Separate Schools Question in Ontario, in CHRISTIANITY 
IN CANADA, supra note 31; C.B. SISSONS, CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADIAN EDUCATION: AN 
HISTORICAL STUDY (1959); WALKER, supra note 1; CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 285-307. 
 129.  
In 1997, the government of Newfoundland changed [its] confessional school 
system into a nonconfessional one, one year after the government of Quebec 
changed its confessional school boards into language-based ones . . . .  In 2001, 
Quebec also abolished its confessional public schools and made them into 
French or English School. 
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still exist in Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan.130  These rights, created as part 
of the so-called “Confederation Compromise,”131 are immune from challenge 
under the Charter’s religious freedom or equality provisions.132  In Ontario, for 
example, millions of dollars are spent on Catholic schools while other religious 
groups, regardless of size, are unable to obtain similar funding.133 
Far from undermining the general theme of religious neutrality found in the 
Charter, however, the denominational schooling provisions of the Constitution 
reinforce the fact that, absent an explicit textual exception, benefits must be 
provided on a non-discriminatory basis.134  Indeed, outside of the context of 
denominational schools, it becomes hard to conceive a modern-day Canadian 
government explicitly limiting benefits or services to members of a particular 
religious group—for political reasons it is unlikely they would even try, and for 
Charter reasons it is extremely unlikely they would succeed.  The continued 
existence of denominational schools, entrenched as they are in the Constitution, 
has become a political question rather than a legal one, but their presence cannot 
logically distract from the theory that the Charter otherwise mandates the 
separation of church and state. 
A more interesting question involves the effect of the Charter’s preamble, 
which states: “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the 
supremacy of God and the rule of law . . . .”135  Does this reference to God, 
 
See CHOQUETTE, supra note 34, at 454 n.2.  Through use of the notwithstanding clause, some 
religious education in public schools still continues in Quebec.  See Rheal Seguin, Quebec Moves 
Closer to Secular Curriculum, GLOBE & MAIL, May 5, 2005, at A4. 
 130. See Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. Of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, ¶ 34. 
 131. See Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.R. 609, ¶ 29. 
 132. See id; see also, Reference Re Bill 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148. 
 133. See, e.g., David Matas, Waldman v. Canada: Religious Discrimination in the Constitution, 
11:3 CONST. FORUM 99 (2000). 
 134. See, e.g., Hogg, supra note 5, at 1277 (“The public funding of the schools of a religious 
denomination without comparable provision for the supporters of the schools of other religious 
denominations would be forbidden by s. 15. . . . . To the extent that a denominational school 
system is protected, or even contemplated, by s. 93, no s. 15 challenge is open.”) (footnoted 
omitted).  Of course, getting rid of denominational school rights does not necessarily mean that 
religious schools are barred from government funding.  For example, under a controversial United 
States Supreme Court decision, vouchers given to students for use at a secular or religious private 
school of their choice was found constitutional under the Establishment Clause because the 
voucher plan did not discriminate between religions or between religious and secular schools.  See 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 135. Preamble, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
ch. 11 (U.K.).  The history of the preamble is discussed by George Egerton, Trudeau, God, and the 
Canadian Constitution: Religion, Human Rights, and Government Authority in the Making of the 
1982 Constitution, in RETHINKING CHURCH, supra note 54, at 99-106.  A more interesting question 
is the effect of the Charter’s preamble, which states that: “Whereas Canada is founded upon 
principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law . . . .” 
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which does not exist anywhere in the United States Constitution, alter the 
Charter’s conception of religious freedom?  For example, one commentator 
asserts that the preamble “would presumably preclude strict ‘no establishment’ 
arguments that have emerged in U.S. Supreme Court rulings against any role for, 
or privileging of, religion in public life.”136  On the other hand, judicial 
interpretation of the reference to God has rendered the preamble an “orphaned 
text”137 and “an embarrassment to be ignored.”138 The Ontario Court of Appeal, 
for example, stated that: 
 
It is a basic principle in the construction of statutes that a 
preamble is rarely referred to and, even then, is usually 
employed only to clarify operative provisions which are 
ambiguous . . . .  Whatever meaning may be ascribed to the 
reference in the preamble to the ‘supremacy of God’, it cannot 
detract from the freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed 
by s. 2(a) which is, it should be noted, a ‘rule of law’ also 
recognized by the preamble.139 
 
Unfortunately, only one law review article has ever been devoted to the 
preamble, and it is, to put it nicely, quite metaphysical.140  More research into 
the philosophical and linguistic meaning of the provision is clearly required. 
I want to tentatively suggest that the preamble, like the Charter itself, is 
liberal in the best sense of the word.  That is, it reflects the traditional liberal 
 
 136. Egerton, supra note 135, at 112 n.26. See also Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education 
(Director), [1988] O.R.2d 641, ¶ 86 (Ont. Ct. App.) (Lacourciere J.A., dissenting) (“[I]t does lend 
credence to the view that a strict separation of church and state is not contemplated by the 
Charter . . . .”). 
 137. Douglas Farrow, Of Secularity and Civil Religion, in RECOGNIZING RELIGION, supra note 
15, at 143. 
 138. Brown, supra note 67, at 561. 
 139. Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director), [1988] O.R.2d 641, ¶ 44 (Ont. Ct. 
App.).  See also O’Sullivan v. Canada, [1991] 84 D.L.R. (4th) 124, 134 (T.D.) (“[R]ecognition of 
the supremacy of God . . . goes no further than this: it prevents the Canadian state from becoming 
officially atheistic . . . . The preamble’s recognition . . . does not prevent Canada from being a 
secular state.”); Weinrib, supra note 109, at 47 (“The Supreme Court of Canada combined its 
generous reading of the Charter’s freedom of religion guarantee with a minimalist reading of its 
preamble . . . . Justice Dickson did not simply ignore it; he neutralized it by emphasizing its 
ecumenical character.”) (footnote omitted).  But see Allen v. Renfrew (County), [2004] O.R.3d 
742, ¶¶ 19-20 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (relying on preamble). 
 140. See Brayton Polka, The Supremacy of God and the Rule of Law in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms: A Theologico-Political Analysis, 32 MCGILL L.J. 854 (1987).  As this article 
went to press, a new article on the Charter’s Preamble appeared.  See Jonathon W. Penney & 
Robert Jacob Danay, The Embarrasing Preamble?  Understanding the Supremacy of God and the 
Charter, 39 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 287 (2006).   
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conception that religion (“the Supremacy of God”) and government (“the rule of 
law”) have their respective spheres and that an intermingling of the two is 
dangerous for each of them.141  Religion is a deeply-seated question of faith and 
conscience, best left to individuals, their families, and their social communities, 
while government assiduously keeps its distance from religious questions and 
concerns itself with the more mundane question of how to ensure a functioning 
civil society.  This division does not mean that religious persons or ideas are 
barred from the public square,142 just as it does not mean that the government 
will never intervene in the affairs of religious persons or organizations when 
overriding values are at stake.143  It does mean, however, that strict neutrality on 
religious questions is seen as the guiding principle for government bodies when 
the two spheres are forced to interact.  Viewed in this light, the preamble both 
reflects and supports the Charter’s general theme of separation, neutrality, and 
equality towards religion. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The theory that the Charter contains a “hidden” establishment clause is 
premised on two arguments.  First, that a close examination of church and state 
cases decided under the Charter’s religious freedom guarantee appear strikingly 
similar in result and reasoning to those decided under the American 
Constitution’s Establishment Clause.  Second, that an analysis of the cases and 
legal commentary show that neutrality is increasingly viewed as the only 
legitimate and appropriate relationship between government and religion.  If 
these two arguments are valid, the separation of church and state is the reality of 
and a requirement for Canadian democracy. 
Many controversial religious freedom issues faced in the United States have 
not as yet arisen in Canada.  When they do, one or two big cases will either 
cement this conception of neutrality and separationism or point to a different 
path.  For now, however, the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in Big M 
appear to be true: “With the Charter, it has become the right of every Canadian 
 
 141. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 166 
(1999) (“The reasons for the separation of church and state are these, among others: it protects 
religion from the state and the state from religion”) (footnote omitted). 
 142. For a discussion the legitimacy of religious views in public deliberations, see e.g., 
Chamberlain v. Surrey School District, [2002] S.C.R. 710, ¶¶ 17-19; Jonathan Chaplin, Beyond 
Liberal Restraint: Defending Religiously-Based Arguments in Law and Public Policy, 33 U. BRIT. 
COLUM. L. REV. 617 (2000). 
 143. See, e.g., R.B. v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] S.C.R. 315 
(upholding forced blood transfusion of Jehovah’s Witness minor). 
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to work out himself or herself what his or her religious obligations, if any, 
should be and it is not for the state to dictate otherwise.”144 
 
 
 144. R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.R. 295, ¶ 135. 
